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Abstract—The power consumption of a microprocessor is a
huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular
exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from
embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app finger-
printing, reverse engineering of firmware, and password recovery
are growing threats. Countermeasures proposed so far are tuned
to specific applications, such as crypto-implementations. They are
not scalable to the large number and variety of applications that
typically run on a general purpose microprocessor.
In this paper, we investigate the design of a microprocessor,
called PARAM with increased resistance to power based side-
channel attacks. To design PARAM, we start with identifying
the most leaking modules in an open-source RISC V processor.
We evaluate the leakage in these modules and then add suitable
countermeasures. The countermeasures depend on the cause of
leakage in each module and can vary from simple modifications
of the HDL code ensuring secure translation by the EDA tools,
to obfuscating data and address lines thus breaking correlation
with the processor’s power consumption. The resultant processor
is instantiated on the SASEBO-GIII FPGA board and found
to resist Differential Power Analysis even after one million
power traces. Compared to contemporary countermeasures for
power side-channel attacks, overheads in area and frequency are
minimal.
Index Terms—Differential Power Analysis, RISC-V, Secure
Microprocessor, Side-Channel Leakage Evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming ubiquitous and
revolutionizing society at large. It is estimated that there will
be around 20 billion connected IoT devices by 2020 [1].
However, embedded processors, which form a core component
of an IoT device, are highly vulnerable to power side-channel
attacks [2]. These attacks glean sensitive information leaked
by exploiting the correlation between the sensitive data and
the processor’s power consumption. The attacks have been
extensively used to break crypto algorithms and recover secret
keys [3]. More recently, they have been applied to reverse
engineer firmware [4], recover passwords [5] and fingerprint
mobile apps [6]. Traditionally, power attacks were countered
by the use of application level mitigations such as masking
the device’s power consumption [7] or hardware level leakage
hiding mechanisms [8]. However, these strategies have consid-
erable overheads and increase the area and power requirements
by orders of magnitude. Thus their use is restricted to a few
specialized components of the system, such as crypto modules,
leaving the remaining components still vulnerable.
Fig. 1: To design a power-attack resistant microprocessor, we start with the
RTL of a processor, use behavioral simulation to identify hotspots of leakage,
and then apply suitable countermeasures to these locations.
In this paper, we take a complementary approach, where
we fundamentally investigate the design of an embedded
microprocessor, called PARAM (an acronym for Power Attack
ResistAnt Microprocessor), with significantly less leakage
through power channels. To achieve this, we (1) evaluate
the side-channel vulnerability of an open-source processor
design, (2) identify modules that leak the most, and (3)
apply appropriate countermeasures to the leaking modules.
The resultant is a processor with significantly increased side-
channel resistance. This approach universally safeguards all
the applications executing on the processor. Also, as this
is a ground-up design process, the processor has negligible
performance degradation, as well as low power and area
overheads as opposed to standard power attack protection
mechanisms such as masking [7], [9] and hiding [10], [11].
To facilitate such a processor design, we first develop a
framework called PLAN: Power attack Leakage ANalyzer,
which, at design time can provide a quick estimate of the side-
channel leakage of a microprocessor. The PLAN framework
takes the source RTL of a processor architecture and bench-
mark applications as input. It provides a report illustrating the
amount of information leakage from each processor module
through the processor’s power consumption.
We apply PLAN to a reference open-sourced RISC-V em-
bedded processor architecture, Shakti-C [12], and identify the
modules with high leakage. These include the register bank,
cache memory, control status registers, execute stage units and
pipeline buffers. We also find that the fixed mapping from
address to cache sets is a major source of leakage. Further,
we found that the EDA tools used in source RTL translation
introduced certain translations, which were functionally cor-
rect, but increased the side-channel leakage of the processor.
Due to this, Floating Point and Branch Prediction Units
leaked information about an AES secret key. These results
are surprising because the evaluated AES implementation did
not have any floating point operations nor any branches that
were dependent on the secret key.
To strengthen the processor against power attacks, we
evaluate the cause of the leakage and fix it module by
module. To achieve this, we first ensure that EDA translations
are not just functionally correct but also do not increase
side-channel vulnerability. Further, we ensure that any data
present in the processor’s data path is obfuscated. Thus, data
present in the cache memory, line buffers, general purpose
registers, and pipeline buffers is in an obfuscated form. The
obfuscation breaks the correlation between the data and the
power consumption, thus reducing leakage. De-obfuscation
only happens in the execute stage of the processor, when
an operation needs to be performed on the data. The result
of the operation is obfuscated again before writing back to
the registers. Thus, in the enhanced processor, PARAM, this
mapping is also obfuscated. Obfuscation is achieved by a 4
round Feistel function with a key that is generated and hidden
inside the processor. The key is periodically changed to ensure
that the scheme is not easily broken.
To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we compare
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [2] on the original Shakti-
C processor and PARAM. The target application is a software
implementation of AES-128. We found that on average, DPA
was able to recover the AES-128 secret key within 62K power
traces on the baseline Shakti-C. On the other hand, DPA
failed to reveal any bytes of the secret key even after one
million power measurements on PARAM. The increase in area
and energy consumed by the processor is small compared to
contemporary side-channel countermeasures.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We propose a framework called PLAN to provide a quick
indication of leaking modules in microprocessors. We use
PLAN to identify the leaking modules in an open-source
RISC V processor, Shakti-C [12] and show that cache
memories, register files, ALU, and pipeline buffers are a
major cause of leakage.
• We experimentally show that performance-centric trans-
lations performed by EDA tools can increase the proces-
sor’s side-channel leakage as a side-effect.
• We provide an extensive evaluation of side-channel leak-
age through cache memories. Our results show that cache
memories leak considerably more about the memory
address than the data stored in the cache. Due to this,
the memory address used in a load/store instruction is
more vulnerable to side-channel leakage than the data
fetched/stored.
• We demonstrate that a combination of HDL program-
ming and obfuscation techniques can be used to design
processors with significantly reduced power side-channel
leakage. The performance, area, and energy overheads to
achieve this side-channel security are minimal.
• We evaluate PARAM on the SASEBO-GIII platform and
demonstrate the resilience to Differential Power Attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the
background on Differential Power Analysis and a side-channel
vulnerability metric used by PLAN. In Section III, details of
the PLAN framework is explained and the results of leakage
analysis on the reference processor are briefly discussed.
Section IV presents the steps involved in designing PARAM,
power side-channel attack resistant microprocessor. Section V
presents the leakage results and DPA results on PARAM.
In Section VI, related work on various countermeasures are
discussed and the limitations of PARAM are enumerated in
Section VII. The final section concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to Differen-
tial Power Analysis (DPA) and a metric called Side Channel
Vulnerability Factor (SVF) [13], which is used in PLAN.
A. Differential Power Analysis
In a Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [2], an attacker
extracts secret information from a device by correlating its
power consumption patterns with a hypothetical model of
the device’s power consumption [14]. The most commonly
used power consumption models are Hamming distance and
Hamming weight. While the former computes the number of
bit toggles between two consecutive values held by a register,
the latter captures the number of bits that are set in a register.
Typical countermeasures for DPA try to break this correlation
by randomizing or hiding the power consumption patterns.
However, all countermeasures proposed so far are mostly
targeted toward crypto-algorithms.
B. Side-channel Vulnerability Factor
Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) [13] is a metric
used to quantify the side-channel leakage of a device. It mea-
sures the correlation between a sensitive application’s (called
victim) execution pattern and the attacker’s side-channel ob-
servations. A high correlation indicates a strong side-channel
leakage. Computing the SVF involves two phases: an online
phase and a post-processing phase.
In the online phase, the application is triggered with N
different inputs. For each input, an Oracle trace, is built to
contain the ground truth that an adversary ideally wants to
read from the device. The Oracle trace can be denoted as
O = (o1, o2, o3, . . . , oi, . . . .oN ) , (1)
2
where oi (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) is the ground truth for the i-th
input. For example, for an AES victim, the input or key
is varied and execution is triggered. The Oracle Trace may
contain values such as S (p ⊕ k), where p is a byte of
the plaintext, k the corresponding secret key byte, and S
the AES S-box operationDuring each execution, the device’s
power consumption patterns are collected and stored in a Side-
Channel trace as follows:
S = (s1, s2, s3, . . . , sj , . . . sN ) , (2)
where sj is the power trace collected for the j-th input.
At the end of the online phase, we have two series of
data. The post-processing phase identifies patterns in each
of the traces and then computes the correlation between
them. Patterns are identified by computing pairwise distances
between data in each trace using a distance metric. This leads
to an Oracle Distance Vector DO having
(
N
2
)
values defined
as follows:
DO =
(
distance(oi, oj), ∀oi, oj ∈ O and i > j
)
.
Similarly, a Side-channel Distance Vector DS having
(
N
2
)
values is constructed from S using a distance metric. Pearson’s
correlation is then computed between these two vectors and
the correlation score is interpreted as the SVF. A high SVF
indicates that the Oracle leaks significantly through the side-
channel. The distance metric used depends on the input data.
In this paper, we use the Hamming distance metric to find
distances between binary data. The Hamming distance is
defined as follows:
HD(xi, xj) =
n−1∑
b=0
hb ∈ N , (3)
where xi and xj are n-bit binary strings and hb is the b-th bit
of (xi ⊕ xj).
III. IDENTIFYING POWER SIDE-CHANNEL LEAKAGE IN
MICROPROCESSORS
To improve the side-channel resiliency of a processor,
we start with the processor source code (RTL) and identify
components that leak side-channel information. We then in-
corporate countermeasures for the leaking modules. In this
section, we present a framework called Power Attack Leakage
ANalyzer PLAN, which works on the RTL of the processor
to identify modules with high leakage.
The processor is represented as a netlist of functional mod-
ules. For example the RISC V processor, Shakti-C [12] has
430 modules such as the main pipeline, FPU, BPU, ALU, data
cache, instruction cache, etc. Each module consists of sub-
modules and signals comprising of a set of wires and registers.
PLAN evaluates every module in the processor independently.
For a given module, it estimates leakage from the signals
associated with that module. Leakage due to sub-modules is
estimated separately.
Formally, we denote the processor netlist, P , as a set of all
modules, i.e.
P = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mi, . . . ,Mm} ,
where Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is the i-th module. Each module
comprises of signals (wires and registers), which we denote
by the set
Mi = {S
(i)
1 , S
(i)
2 , . . . , S
(i)
j , . . . , S
(i)
n } ,
where S
(i)
j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) is a signal defined in the module Mi
and can be of one or more bits.
PLAN is designed based on the following assumptions:
1) Power consumed by a k-bit signal, S, is proportional to
its Hamming weight. We define the power model by the
function
PM (S) =
k−1∑
b=0
Sb ,
where Sb is the b-th bit in S.
2) Let Y(Mi) be a function that concatenates all signals in
Mi. We define this function as follows:
Y(Mi) = (S
(i)
1 ||S
(i)
2 || . . . ||S
(i)
n ) ,
where || represents concatenation operation. Thus, if
each signal in Mi is 32-bits, Y(Mi) will be 32 ×n
bits. We estimate the power consumed by module Mi
as an aggregation of the power consumed by all signals
in module Mi. Thus, the data held in Y(Mi) directly
relates to the power consumed by the module Mi.
3) SVF between Y(Mi) and the secret data provides an
estimate of the side-channel leakage for the module Mi.
PLAN works by executing benchmark programs multiple
times with different inputs on a pre-synthesized netlist.
Before starting the execution, the user identifies one or
more interesting operations in each benchmark program.
For example, some of the interesting operations in the first
round of an AES benchmark program are p ⊕ k, S( p ⊕ k ),
2 · S( p ⊕ k ) and so on. The contents of these locations are
used as Oracle trace. To quantify side-channel leakage from
a module Mi, the side-channel trace is formed by capturing
data present in Y(Mi). For each execution of the benchmark,
Y(Mi) is a time-series vector whose elements correspond to
data in each clock cycle. SVF between the Oracle trace and
side-channel trace is computed by first performing a pattern
extraction and then a correlation analysis as discussed below.
Pattern Extraction. Assume that each benchmark is executed
N times and each run is for d clock cycles. The data present
in Y(Mi) in the j-th run of the benchmark forms a vector of
the form (y(j,1), y(j,2), y(j,3), . . . , y(j,d)). This vector forms an
element in the side-channel trace. Thus in Equation 2,
sj = (y(j,1), y(j,2), y(j,3), . . . , y(j,k), . . . , y(j,d)) ,
where y(j,k) represents the data in Y(Mi) in the k-th clock
cycle. We thus have a matrix of dimension N×d which forms
the Side-channel trace (see Figure 2). The Oracle trace are
scalars obtained from the output of an interesting point. Thus
in Equation 1,
oj = 〈output of interesting point, such as p⊕ k or S(p⊕ k)〉
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Fig. 2: Overview of SVF computation for a processor module Mi using
PLAN.
The next step is to identify patterns in each trace using
pairwise distances to form the Oracle Distance Vector DO
and Side-Channel Distance Vector DS (refer Section II-B).
We evaluated several distance metrics, such as Euclidean
distance, Cosine similarity, Hamming weight and found
Hamming distance as the most suited. Hamming distance
(Equation 3) captures the distance between two n-bit binary
vectors and it performs well in the presence of noise in the
signals.
Correlation Analysis. Each clock cycle would result in a
different Side-Channel Distance Vector, which we denote
D(S,c), where 1 ≤ c ≤ d. Pearson’s correlation coefficient (ρ)
is computed between DO and each D(S,c), and the absolute
value is taken to provide the SVF. We thus have d different
SVF values, of which the maximum is considered as leakage
of the module Mi. This is formally stated as follows:
SV FMi = Max(|ρ(DO,DS,c)|) 1 ≤ c ≤ d . (4)
A. Leakage Analysis on Shakti-C
As a case study, we apply PLAN to an open-source RISC-
V processor, Shakti-C 1. Shakti-C is a 64-bit, 5-stage in-
order processor with a 16KB instruction cache and a 16KB
data cache. It has a bi-modal Branch Prediction Unit (BPU)
with a coupled Branch Target Buffer (BTB) and an IEEE 754
compliant Floating Point Unit (FPU).
1https://bitbucket.org/casl/c-class/
The source code is built of 430 modules arranged hierar-
chically. The modules can be considered to be part of either
the data path or the control path. In this work, we evaluate
leakage due to the data path comprising of the data cache,
register file, load-store units, and all modules in the execute
and writeback stage of the processor pipeline.
We found that an implementation of AES-128 uses all of
these processor components. The AES-128 implementation
considered uses a 256-byte lookup table to implement the
SubBytes operation. Separate functions are present to im-
plement ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey
operations. These operations comprise of data memory ac-
cesses and integer ALU operations. Side-channel leakage due
to control path components like instruction cache, fetch and
decode stages in the pipeline, and branch prediction units
are not easily protected at the architecture level. Section VII
provides further details.
In the first stage of PLAN, behavioral simulation of Shakti-
C with the benchmark programs is performed. Value Change
Dump (VCD) samples are collected with multiple random
inputs given to the benchmark program. Each VCD sample
captures the signals from all 430 functional modules. The
PLAN framework evaluates SVF for these VCD samples to
pinpoint leaking modules in Shakti-C. For the Oracle trace, all
intermediate operations in the first round of the AES-128 were
considered. SV FMi (Equation 4) is computed for all interme-
diate operations, and for all the 430 modules. Table I provides
the maximum SV FMi observed for SubBytes operation. As
is seen in the table, memory hierarchy comprising of the data
cache, data line, and hit buffers, leak the most. Considerable
leakage is also observed in the Registers and Functional Units.
We found the Floating Point Unit (FPU), Branch Prediction
Unit (BPU), and the Multiply-divide module in the ALU to
leak considerably. This result is surprising because, the AES-
128 benchmark program used does not have any floating
point operations, branches, nor performs any multiplication
or division. Later in this section, we investigate the cause of
this leakage.
Figure 3 shows a pictorial view of the Shakti-
C floor plan obtained from Synopsys IC Compiler
(version M-2016.12-SP5-4). Each color denotes the magnitude
of leakage, with modules in Red having the most leakage. In
these modules, the secret can be completely observed through
the side-channel. The modules in Blue, on the other hand, leak
the least. As can be seen from Figure 3, leakage is due to a
small portion of the chip. It is sufficient to insert countermea-
sures to protect only these regions. In the remainder of this
section, we evaluate the most leaking modules in Shakti-C.
Leakage in Memory Hierarchy. The memory hierarchy and
storage structures (cache memories, register-files, etc.) of a
processor contribute considerably to data-movement. When
a cache miss occurs, 64 bytes of data are loaded from the
off-chip RAM to a Line Buffer (LB). The critical word is
also stored in the Physical Register File (PRF) and MEM-
WB buffer (refer Figure 4). The PRF is a register file used
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TABLE I: Module wise SVF for AES-128 benchmark on Shakti-C. Leaking
signals specifies the number of signals in a module that leaks, while leak
count specifies the number of points in the DS that have SVF more than 0.3.
Module
Leak
Count
SVF
#Leaking
Signals
Memory Hierarchy
Data Cache 165 0.99
85Hit Buffer 35 0.35
Line Buffer 2 1.0
Registers
Register File 3 1.0
24PRF 25 1.0
CSR 13 0.64
Functional
Units
ALU 38 0.99
21FPU 3 1.0
Mul-Div Unit 2 1.0
Interstage
Buffers
IF-ID 0 0
5
ID-EXE 11 1.0
EXE-MEM 6 1.0
MEM-WB 4 1.0
Instruction
Fetch
BPU 2 0.95 1
Instruction
Memory
Instruction Cache 0 0.0
0
Line Buffer 0 0.0
TLB
Instruction TLB 0 0.0
0
Data TLB 0 0.10
Fig. 3: Information leakage plot shows the floor plan for Shakti-C illustrating
the modules with their side-channel leakage.
for operand forwarding while MEM-WB is a pipeline buffer
between the memory stage and the writeback stage in the
processor. In the next clock cycle, the data is forwarded to
the data cache where it is stored in one of the 128 cache lines
present. The choice of the cache set depends on the address
used in the load or store instruction. When a memory operation
results in a cache hit, the LB, Hit Buffer (HB) and data cache
are queried in parallel. If the required data is present in any
of these structures, it is returned to the MEM-WB buffer. In
the following cycle, the required data is copied into the HB,
if it is not already present.
Every load or store operation containing data correlated
with the Oracle results in a high SVF in the data cache,
LB, HB, and MEM-WB buffer (Table I). For example, in the
AES-128 benchmark implementation, several operations can
cause leakage in these components. The SubBytes operation
S(p ⊕ k) for instance, ex-ors a plaintext byte (p) to a key
byte (k) and uses the result as an index into a lookup table
Fig. 4: Data paths of Shakti-C interconnects the storage structures.
SubBytes
1 addi a1,gp,-1264 # a1=&p
2 lbu a2,0(a1) # Load value at a1 into a2
3 addi a3,gp,-2024 # a3=&k
4 lbu a4,0(a3) # Load value at a3 into a4
5 xor a5,a2,a4 # Compute p ⊕ k
6 addi a6,gp,1332 # a6=&S
7 add a7,a5,a6 # a7=a5+a6
8 lbu a8,0(a7) # Load S[p ⊕ k] into a8
Fig. 5: AES SubBytes operation having data memory access and integer ALU
instructions .
present in the RAM. RISC V instructions to perform this is
shown in Figure 5. To evaluate this code snippet, we build
multiple Oracle traces: k (contents of register a4 in Line 4),
index for the lookup table p ⊕ k (register a7 in Line 8), and
result of SBox lookup, S(p ⊕ k) (register a8 in Line 8). All
components in the memory hierarchy leak considerably during
these load operations independent of whether there is a cache
hit or a miss. The leakage is due to either the address or the
data lines in the memory hierarchy. The next part of the section
evaluates the leakage due to the address and data lines in the
cache memory.
Evaluating the Leakage due to Address and Data in the Cache.
An address sent to the data cache affects the tag memory
and determines the cache set. On the other hand, the data
only affects a specific cache line. Intuitively, since address
lines influence a larger portion of the cache memory, it should
leak more. We validate this with two experiments. In the first
experiment, we fill all cache lines with the same data, perform
multiple memory accesses to different addresses that hit in
the cache and measure the differential power consumption
estimates using the Hamming distance model and apply the
Welch t-test [15]. This provides leakage exclusively due to
address lines in the cache memory. In the second experiment,
we measure the differential power consumption by accessing
the same address multiple times by repeatedly modifying the
data. This provides an estimate of the leakage due to data lines
in the cache memory.
Figure 6a shows the t-scores between pairs of cache set
(the result of the first experiment), while Figure 6c shows
the t-scores between pairs of data values (the result of the
second experiment). The distribution in all cases is normal,
with different mean and variance (see Figure 6b and 6d). The
leakage due to the address lines is considerably higher. Thus,
to reduce side-channel leakage from the cache memory, it is
required to obfuscate the address as well as the data lines.
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(a) Pairwise differential power con-
sumption of cache sets.
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(b) Power consumption distribution
for 4 arbitrarily chosen cache sets.
(c) Pairwise differential power con-
sumption for data stored in a cache
set.
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(d) Power consumption distribution
for arbitrarily chosen data stored in
a cache set.
Fig. 6: Leakage in Shakti-C data cache due to cache sets and data. The former
being the more prominent of the leakages.
Leakage in Register Files and Interstage Buffers. For a load
instruction, data in MEM-WB buffer is forwarded to Register
File (RF) (or vice-versa for a store instruction) as shown in
Figure 4. The Physical Register File (PRF) stores the output
from the execution unit during operand forwarding and also
during a cache miss.
The pipeline buffer ID-EXE lies in between decode and
execute stage. It holds the data read from the RF or PRF.
Similarly, the EXE-MEM and MEM-WB buffers, stores the
results of the execute stage and the data corresponding to the
load and store instruction. All these modules directly hold
sensitive data, therefore, have high SVF. Additionally, the
Control and Status Register (CSR) has a high SVF of 0.64.
Leakage in ALU. For an ALU operation, register operands
from the RF are fetched and stored in the ALU register. For
instance, operations such as p ⊕ k (Line 5 in Figure 5), simple
addition having sensitive information as in Line 7 results in
high SVF in the ALU modules.
Leakage due to EDA Tool Translations. A hardware design
flows through various EDA tools during the design process.
Each tool performs several translations on the design. For
example, tools may optimize the design to reduce area, energy,
or to improve performance. Each of these translations is done
ensuring that the functionality of the design is intact. However,
none of the EDA tools evaluate for side-channel security.
As a result, the translations may increase the side-channel
vulnerability of the device.
The Shakti-C [12] RISC V processor is coded in Bluespec
(a) Expected design of Execution Unit in Shakti-C.
(b) Design after Bluespec compilation. The change in the placement of
register causes increased leakage.
Fig. 7: EDA tools perform translations keeping functionality intact. Some of
these translations may increase side-channel vulnerability as we found in the
Execute Unit of Shakti-C when compiled with Bluespec.
System Verilog (BSV) [16]. The BSV code is compiled by
the Bluespec.2018.10.beta1 compiler generating synthesizable
Verilog RTL. We look at the Execute Unit of Shakti-C to
understand how the Bluespec compiler increases side-channel
vulnerability.
Figure 7a shows the expected behavior of the Execution
Unit of Shakti-C. In the execute stage, register operands are
read from the Register File (RF) or PRF and forwarded to the
different functional units, such as the ALU, FPU, and Mul-
Div. In each of the units, a multiplexer chooses to forward
the operands to a register depending on the select line. For
instance, for an ALU operation, register operands are only
sent to the register in the ALU. The registers in the other
functional units will store the default value 0.
Figure 7b shows the Execute Unit of Shakti-C after the
compilation of the Bluespec code. The positions of the mul-
tiplexer and register in each functional unit are interchanged.
While this modification does not change the functionality of
the design, we observe that the register operands are stored
in all units independent of the type of operation. Therefore,
register operands corresponding to an ALU operation are
stored in FPU and Mul-Div modules. Thus, for the AES-128
benchmark, in spite of having no floating point operations,
multiplications or divisions, PLAN shows a high SVF in the
FPU and Mul-Div units as seen in Table I and Figure 3.
A similar observation is also made in the branch prediction
unit (BPU). The result of the ALU is forwarded to the BPU
to store the target of a branch instruction. As with the FPU
and Mul-Div units, the position of the Multiplexer and BPU
register are interchanged by the Bluespec compiler. Thus,
every output of the ALU gets stored in the BPU register,
causing it to leak. Hence the BPU shows up with high
SVF (see Table I and Figure 3) for the AES-128 benchmark
even though there are no sensitive branch operations. These
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leakages can be fixed by minor RTL changes that prevent the
compiler from placing the register ahead of the multiplexer.
Section IV provides more details.
B. Caveats on PLAN
PLAN is designed to provide a fine-grained evaluation of the
power side-channel leakage in hardware designs. It is designed
to provide quick results and therefore its scope is restricted to
the most important leakages. In spite of the reduced scope,
we show that our hardened processor, PARAM, withstands
Differential Power Analysis (DPA), even after one million
power traces. In this section, we enumerate the caveats of
PLAN.
Linear Correlation. SVF measures the linear correlation be-
tween Oracle and Side-Channel vectors. Most powerful side-
channel attacks such as DPA, exploit such linear correlations.
SVF cannot identify leakages when the Oracle and Side-
Channel vectors are non-linearly correlated.
Leakage through Static Power Consumption. PLAN is
restricted to evaluating leakage due to the dynamic power
consumption of the processor. The dynamic power consump-
tion is the most exploited in power side-channel attacks.
Recently, information has shown to leak from the static power
consumption [17], [18]. These attacks are considerably more
difficult as the leakage is several times smaller than dynamic
power consumption. Leakage due to static power consumption
is beyond the scope of this work.
Use of Pre-synthesized Netlist. Pinpointing leaking modules
and characterizing the leakage cannot be done on actual
hardware. It requires a simulated environment and access to
the device’s source code.
PLAN evaluates leakage based on behavioral simulation.
Power consumption variations due to placement and routing,
and other timing constraints are therefore not considered.
The advantage we gain by using behavioural simulation is
that the time required for executing PLAN is significantly
lesser compared to when PLAN uses a post place-and-route
simulation. For example, evaluating the complete Shakti-C
processor using behavioral simulation takes around 5 hours
on a standard Intel i5 desktop CPU. Evaluating just the data
cache of Shakti-C with post place-and-route simulation, takes
over 9 hours in the same environment. A single evaluation of
the complete Shakti-C is expected to take over a month.
Detecting Leakages due to EDA Translations. Every EDA
translation can introduce new side-channel vulnerabilities.
Since PLAN works with the pre-synthesized netlist, leakage
detection due to the EDA tool is restricted only to this
stage. Vulnerabilities that may be introduced in other EDA
translations are not identifiable.
IV. THE DESIGN OF A POWER ATTACK RESISTANT
MICROPROCESSOR: PARAM
To design a power side-channel attack resistant micropro-
cessor would require all leaking modules to be fixed. From
the observations in Section III-A, leaking modules can be
categorized as (1) modules that hold data correlated with the
secret and (2) modules that leak due to security agnostic EDA
translations. In this section, we harden Shakti-C by either
reducing or eliminating leakages. The resultant, power attack
hardened processor is called PARAM.
A. Preventing leakage due to data correlated with the secret
Modules in the data path such as Register Files, Inter Stage
buffers, Control Status words, and the memory hierarchy store
data that is highly correlated with the secret. Hence these
modules contribute considerably to the side-channel leakage
of the processor. Further, in the cache memory, we find that
the fixed mapping from address to cache set causes significant
leakage. In this section, we introduce obfuscation techniques
to reduce these leakages.
Reducing leakage in the data path. To reduce leakage in
modules present in the data path, we design PARAM such that
data is almost always in an obfuscated form. The obfuscation
breaks the correlation between the secret and power consumed
by the module thus reducing leakage. When data, d, is fetched
from the off-chip memory due to a cache miss, it is obfuscated
using a tiny algorithm, Ok, with secret key k. The secret key
is generated securely within the processor and never exposed.
The obfuscation operation can be represented as follows:
d′ = Ok(d) . (5)
The obfuscated data (d′) is stored in all storage elements in
the data path, including the data cache, LB and HB, Pipeline
Buffers, Memory Access Units, and Register files (RF and
PRF). In Figure 8, this obfuscated data path is shown in red
dashed lines. The obfuscated data d′ is de-obfuscated using
the inverse function O−1k as follow:
d = O−1k (d
′) . (6)
De-obfuscation is done when an operation needs to be per-
formed on the data, typically in the execute stage of the
processor. The results of the operation are encrypted again
before it is passed through the rest of the pipeline. De-
obfuscation also occurs during a cache eviction, when data
is written back to the off-chip RAM.
Reducing Leakage due to fixed address to cache set
mapping. As seen in Figure 6, each cache set has a dif-
ferent power consumption signature. To hide this signature,
PARAM obfuscates the address, a, sent to the cache memory.
Obfuscation is done for the tag and set index bits, keeping the
offset bits unchanged. Let tagsetindex(a) denote the tag
and set index bits of an address a and offset(a) denote the
offset bits of the address a, then the obfuscation of address a,
denoted a′, is done as follows:
a′ = Ok(tagsetindex(a))||offset(a) , (7)
where || is the concatenation operation. Thus, for every request
to the data cache, the tag and set index bits of the address
are first encrypted. This obfuscation breaks the deterministic
address to cache set mapping. Further, the key k is changed
periodically. For every key, the mapping from address to
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Fig. 8: Overview of PARAM processor architecture having protection against power side-channel attacks by obfuscating address lines of data cache and
data of data cache memory subsystem, Physical Register File (PRF) and Register File. Remapping unit is responsible for updating data values in the above
mentioned locations whenever the obfuscation key changes. Red dashed lines are carrying obfuscated data values from which the actual data can be retrieved
by using key values.
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Fig. 9: Address and data obfuscation in the data cache reduces leakage
considerably. The power consumption distributions of arbitrary cache sets are
almost similar.
cache set changes. Thus, the same address gets mapped to
different cache sets over time. This prevents the attacker from
learning the unique power consumption signatures of a cache
set. Figure 9 shows the t-scores computed on pairwise power
consumption between cache sets. Compared to Figure 6, the
differential power consumption (obtained by Hamming dis-
tance model) is reduced considerably indicating significantly
less leakage. Later in the section, we provide more details
about this remapping.
Obfuscation Function. The main purpose of the obfuscation
function is to break the correlation between the power con-
sumption of the processor and the data stored. The obfuscation
function is in the critical path, therefore this function has to
be extremely small. We choose a 4-round Feistel structure
to perform the obfuscation. The input address or data to be
obfuscated is of 32 bits and is split into two parts of 16 bits
each. The Feistel structure takes 16 key bits, generated from
an LFSR present in the hardware as input in every round and
uses an Affine transformation to combine the key with the
input. The output is a well-mixed function of the input and
key. Appendix A has more details on this obfuscation function.
Security Evaluation. All keys are generated internally and
completely transparent from the users. Similarly, all obfus-
cated data is not accessible by any user of the processor. Due
to this, the only possible attack is through side-channel leakage
of the key. To protect against side-channel attacks, we adopt
a re-keying countermeasure [19] by which the key is changed
at regular intervals to ensure that an attacker does not obtain
sufficient side-channel information to break the obfuscation.
The re-keying requires a remapping of the obfuscated data
and addresses to ensure correct functionality. We next discuss
the Remapping Unit present in PARAM.
Remapping Unit. The Remapping Unit is centralized in
PARAM (see Figure 8). Upon receiving a key change request
from the software, it first generates a new key from an LFSR
present in the hardware. The new key is used to remap the
obfuscated data. This is done by de-obfuscating with the old
key (ko) and then obfuscating again with the new key (kn) as
follows:
d′′ = Okn(O
−1
ko
(d′)) . (8)
Additionally, since the mapping from address to cache sets
are obfuscated, PARAM remaps the cache sets based on the
new key. A straightforward way to achieve this is to invalidate
the entire cache. This involves, writing back dirty cache lines
to the off-chip RAM and then changing the obfuscation key.
However, this requires the data cache to be blocked during the
remapping phase. Further, there would be an increase in the
number of cache misses, since the data has to be reloaded into
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wire rg_out$D_IN;
reg rg_out;
assign rg_out$D_IN = 
{a1>‘h20, a1+a2};
always@(posedge clk) begin
  rg_out <= rg_out$D_IN;
end 
assign out = rg_out[31:0];
assign RDY_out = rg_out[32];
wire rg_out$D_IN;
reg rg_out;
assign rg_out$D_IN = a1 > ‘h20 ? 
{1’b1, a1+a2} : 33’h0FFFFFFF;
always@(posedge clk) begin
  rg_out <= rg_out$D_IN;
end 
assign out = rg_out[31:0];
assign RDY_out = rg_out[32];
rule rl_addition;
  if(a1 > ‘h20)
    rg_out <= tagged Valid (a1+a2);
  else
    rg_out <= tagged Invalid;
Endrule
/* A combinational block then reads 
rg_out and checks valid bit before 
using it */
rule rl_addition;
  if(a1 > ‘h20)
    rg_out <= {1’b1, (a1+a2)};
  else
    rg_out <= {1’b0, 32’d-1};
Endrule
/* A combinational block then reads 
rg_out and checks valid bit before 
using it */
(a) (b)
BSV  to Verilog Translation 
by Bluespec Compiler
BSV  to Verilog Translation 
by Bluespec Compiler
Fig. 10: An illustration of leakages due to EDA translations (a) Before Fix
(b) After Fix
the cache. An alternative was suggested by Qureshi in [20],
where a gradual remap was used to reduce overheads. In the
gradual remap, a cache set will be remapped periodically with-
out blocking the cache. PARAM uses the former approach.
Qureshi’s gradual remapping will be incorporated in the future.
B. Preventing power leakages due to EDA translations.
Shakti-C is coded using Bluespec System Verilog (BSV).
We explain the leakage caused by the Bluespec translation
from BSV to synthesizable Verilog, with a small example of an
addition. In Figure 10a, ideally, the register should have been
latched with the output of the adder (a1 + a2) only when the
condition (a1 > 'h20) is true. However, to save a multiplexer
and the associated delay, we see that the EDA translation
removes this check and appends the 33rd bit with the condition
(a1 > 'h20). Now, the adder’s outputs are always latched
to the register but discarded when it is read by some other
combinational logic, that first checks the 33rd bit for validity.
Although this is functionally correct, it leaks information as
the result of the adder’s outputs are always latched.
To stymie this leakage, we modified the Bluespec code,
added the valid bit and made sure that a constant value
1 is latched onto the register when the condition fails, as
illustrated in Figure 10b. This small change, that costs an extra
multiplexer, reduces leakage. In the context of Shakti-C, the
datapath from the register-file to FPU, Mul-Div unit and the
datapath from ALU to BPU have been altered to send data
only when the data is associated with the corresponding units,
similar to the example illustrated here.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
To validate the information leakage in PARAM, we passed
PARAM through PLAN. We found that leakages due to corre-
lation between sensitive data and power consumption reduced
in memory hierarchy modules and register file. Figure 11
corroborates our result. Information leakage due to EDA tool
translations in modules such as BPU, FPU and Mul-Div
unit have been completely eliminated in PARAM. However,
leakage due to the ALU module is not altered. We synthesized
PARAM for a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA (xc7k160tfbg676-1).
Compared to Shakti-C, which had (51K LUTs and 21K FFs),
❉ ✁✂✁✄☎
▲✆✝☎
❇✞✟ ✟ ☎ ❘
✄✆❍
❇✞✟ ✟ ☎ ❘
✁❈❘
❘☎ ●✆❈❍☎ ❘✟ ✆▲☎
✆✝❍☎ ●☎ ❘
❘✟
✂▲✞
P❘✟
Fig. 11: Information leakage plot shows the floor plan for PARAM illustrating
the modules with their SVF values in different colors.
PARAM requires 73K LUTs and 22K FFs, an increase of
22K more LUTs. The maximum clock frequency reduced from
48MHz in Shakti-C to 33MHz in PARAM. The increase in
area and clock period is mainly due to the obfuscation circuit.
Each realization of the obfuscation function is a combinational
logic requiring 152 LUTs. Several instances of this circuit
are needed. More efficient obfuscation functions can reduce
these overheads considerably. It should be noted, that since all
additions to PARAM were combinational circuits, the cycles
per instruction (CPI) for the processor is the same as that of
Shakti-C.
To test the efficacy of PARAM at withstanding side-
channel attacks, we mounted a first-order DPA with AES-
128 executing on the processor and compared the results
against the original Shakti-C processor. The DPA test platform
comprised of a SASEBO-GIII FPGA board which instantiated
the processors and Lecroy Teledyne HDO4104 oscilloscope.
The DPA results are shown in Figure 12. The correct key value
is disclosed after 62319 traces in the unprotected Shakti-C
processor. On the other hand, in PARAM no AES key was
recovered even after 1 million power traces (see Figure 12b).
Figure 13 shows the correlation scores for Shakti-C and
PARAM. It can be seen that in Shakti-C, the correct key is
highly correlated compared to the wrong keys. However, no
such high correlation is observed in PARAM.
VI. RELATED WORK
Since Paul Kocher’s seminal work on Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) [2], there have been innumerable attempts
to protect devices against the attack. While algorithmic level
countermeasures such as [19], [21], customize protocols and
cipher algorithms to be inherently secure, implementation level
countermeasures, such as masking [7], [22] and threshold
implementations [23], use randomization to hide leakage due
to sensitive operations. All these approaches are designed to
protect crypto-algorithms and cannot be generalized for an
arbitrary application. Device-level countermeasures like [8]
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Fig. 12: DPA results of reference architecture before and after leakage mitigation. a) Shakti-C architecture has Mean Time for key Disclosure at 62319 traces
b) PARAM has very low correlation score for correct key byte guess even for 1 million traces.
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Fig. 13: Correlation scores for each key byte guess in DPA. a) Shakti-C has high correlation for correct key byte value for 62319 traces. b) Correlation
scores of key byte guess in PARAM architecture for 1 million traces.
use custom gates that consume power independent of the
gate’s switching. While these approaches can be generalized to
protect any application, their performance overheads, typically
over 100%, limits their usability to very small circuits. This
approach is therefore not suitable to protect entire micropro-
cessors. Recently, Nabel et al. [24] proposed a processor that
operates on encrypted data and supports arithmetic operations
such as modular multiplication, exponentiation, and inversion.
In addition to other security benefits, their processor is re-
sistant to side-channel attacks. However, the processor has
limited capabilities, such as in Root-of-Trust devices. PARAM,
on the other hand, is the first work to achieve side-channel
security in general purpose microprocessor. Besides providing
blanket security to all applications running on the processor,
the overheads are lower compared to other countermeasures.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF PARAM
While we emphasize the fact that PARAM is the first general
purpose processor hardened for power side-channel attacks, it
has some limitations, which we will now enumerate.
• PARAM is designed by fixing the leaking modules that
PLAN identifies. All the limitations of PLAN (discussed
in Section III-B) are inherent limitations of PARAM.
Thus, for example, PARAM cannot protect against attacks
that use leakage through static power consumption.
• Most leakages in Shakti-C have either been eliminated or
reduced considerably. However, some modules still leak,
for example in the ALU. Protecting the ALU requires all
arithmetic operations to be protected. This is part of our
future work.
• Our focus in this paper was to reduce leakage in the
data path of the processor. Leakage can also occur in
the control path. For example, consider the code snippet
shown below which computes akey.
exp(a, key){
for(r=1, i=0; i < 1024; ++i){
if (key[i] == 1) r = r * a;
r = r * r;
}
return r;
}
Leakage about the key occurs due to the differential paths
taken when key = 1 and key = 1. We believe that these
control path leakages can be better solved with the help of
compiler techniques. Obfuscation in the hardware alone
may not be able to protect against these leakages.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes the first general purpose micropro-
cessor with built-in security for power side-channel attacks.
The processor, which we call PARAM, is derived from a
RISC V processor, with a majority of the side-channel vul-
nerabilities rectified. During the process of this design, we
found interesting causes of side-channel leakage such as the
EDA tool translations and address to cache set mapping.
A combination of programming techniques and obfuscation
of the data path helped reduce the leakage considerably.
PARAM is validated for correctness on an FPGA and its side-
channel security verified by mounting a first-order DPA attack.
While PARAM’s overheads are low compared to other DPA
countermeasures, we believe that the overheads can be reduced
further by better designs for the obfuscation functions and by
increasing the number of pipeline stages in the processor. This
is left as future work.
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APPENDIX A
OBFUSCATION FUNCTION
PARAM uses a 4-round Feistel network having an Affine
function F in each round to transform the data and key values
as shown in Figure 14. In each round, the input is divided into
two halves, say L and R, in which the L part is ex-ored with
the output of the Affine function Y . The Affine function takes
the R part and the key as inputs, each of n bits, and produces
an n bit output as follows:
Y = A(R||K) + C , (9)
where A is an affine matrix and C is a round constant. The
Affine function for the first round with n = 16 is shown in
the Figure 15. In the next round, R and output of ex-or are
swapped and fed as L and R respectively. To perform de-
obfuscation keys are fed in the reverse order.
Fig. 14: (a) Structure of the obfuscation function uses Feistel network with 4
rounds. (b) 32×16 affine function used in Feistel structure.
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
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x31


+


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

Fig. 15: Affine transformation used in the obfuscation for the First Round.
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